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ABSTRACT PAGE

Name: Jordan Werner

Major: Philosophy

THE SOCRATIC METHOD AND THE ALIENATION OF WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY
Advisor’s Name: Dr. Ted Zenzinger
Reader’s Name: Dr. Anandita Mukherji

The Socratic Method has been the choice way to do philosophy for as long as philosophy
has existed as a discipline. This method is aggressive and hierarchical, two traits that due to the
semantics of engendered language alienate and exclude women. This alienation happens
inevitably when the choice is presented to play the “game” that is the argumentative discipline of
philosophy or not. When women chose to play the game, they are alienated from themselves.
Philosophy is a highly universal and analytical discipline, that often does not allow for firstperson narrative or philosophy done through the body, which is something that empowers most
women. This means that women must do work they may not value, and in a Marxist sense are
alienated from the product of their labor. If women do not play “the game” they are often
excluded from the discipline through a lack of interaction with others and diminished
opportunities due to the nature of their work. I proffer that this can be solved by changing how
we define philosophy and philosophical success within the discipline.
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Introduction
Susan Brison says “Women face the cataclysmic destruction of their world alone,
surrounded by people who find it so hard to understand what’s so distressing”1. While she is
talking about the threat of violence that all women feel, this is the same feeling women have
when doing philosophy, something that can destroy and create their worlds through theory, while
those around them have little personal stake in the matter other than their own success and
desires. Philosophy is a cataclysm of a vacuum of white men and their opinions. The world
seems to have made significant progress within the disparities between genders and minorities of
all kinds. We see the National Football League using advertisements that promote women within
the sport, we see women feeling empowered with America’s first female Vice President. Yet,
within the academic discipline of philosophy, it seems as if nothing has changed, and at best
these topics have been addressed by those with power inside academia with a surface level
analysis.
I began my thesis research wondering about Lucretius, a Roman philosopher from the 1st
century BCE who believed that women were nothing but subhuman, and no one quite understood
his negative attitudes as they were somewhat crammed into the end of his book. This led me to
consider the broader conception of women in Roman philosophy. I found that while it was
important to developing my thesis, this conception did not, and still cannot, fully capture my
experience within philosophy.
I am fundamentally interested in understanding how the history of philosophy has
affected the ways in which philosophy is problematic today, and how we can solve these
problems. I will thus focus on a few main questions. First, what type of discrimination do women
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face in philosophy today? Second, in what way does the discussion of this type of discrimination
mirror my own experience, and in what ways may my own experience enhance an understanding
of this discrimination? Lastly, what solutions to discrimination are available? I will use the
method “influx and efflux”, described by Jane Bennett in Influx and Efflux. These terms refer to
the ability to freely have inputs and outputs of ideas that are inspired by others. She draws
inspiration from Walt Whitman’s poetry in an attempt to write in a style that takes in more than
just the individual, an almost “democratic” form of philosophical writing. Democratic writing is
important as it takes the experiences of all and the narratives of all to be truth, to be validated and
heard. There is something deeper to be said about choosing Jane Bennett and her illustrious
interpretation on Whitman to write a thesis of this topic. It is the understanding that a space for
all is created when we value the shared essence, the cause of our individual vibrations and the
influx and efflux we all experience, whether we believe we can control it or not. In allowing this
thesis to permeate your sphere of thought, you are allowing for an acceptance of an entangled
world that enacts a process where my writing will pervade, enable, and disrupt you. Hopefully all
for the betterment of influxes of all kinds. In this world philosophy is in a constant state of
influx, yet this piece is my efflux, my wave washing up on the beach that is philosophical
discourse.
It is important to note in this introduction I am attempting to dismantle the way we have
done philosophy, particularly Socratic thinking. This is a bold endeavor yet is necessary for the
discipline to have any substantial change to a problem at many universities, the men that bully
others out of spaces that should be accessible and there for all.
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Why Now?
Women seem to be the hot topic in philosophy right now, as the societies we live in are
beginning to open up to the idea of feminism more (than we used to). Women have always
existed within philosophy, even dating back to the ancient Greeks. There have always been
women in philosophy, even the medieval period, Heloise, Hildegard of Bingen, Catherine of
Sienna, and Julian of Norwich just to name a few. The climate around gender, oppression, and
other is changing, and with that the way we come to identify people is also. Philosophy has
consistently excluded not only in the sense of you may not do this but if you are doing this you
may not be called a philosopher. The idea of calling women who have philosophical thought
philosophers is a fairly recent phenom, in the past they were called mystics, spiritual women, or
thought to be possessed (because how could a woman possibly know so much).2 The majority of
this research has been completed recently, discovering more women that existed within historical
philosophical thought every day. This is leading to a resurgence in the discussion of women, and
a new way of how women have participated in philosophy.

Sexist Presuppositions and Responses in the History of Philosophy
To have Mary Wollstonecraft publish a book entitled A Vindication of the Rights of
Women (1792) immediately parodied by Thomas Taylor in a book entitled A Vindication of the
Rights of Beasts (1792) should say enough about the problem that is at hand, yet that is not
enough. There are plenty of examples of sexism and how women are forgotten. These authors
that are presupposing these sexist ideas such as Thomas Moore in particular matter as they are
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some of the biggest figures in the canon and are taught in almost every introductory class. They
happen to override all of the work done by women on the same topics at the same time due to the
fact that there was more access to resources for white men.

Aristotle
Lynda Lange in her article “Women is Not a Rational Animal”, which is a commentary
on how Aristotle, while ethically engaging, needs to have some contention via modern
philosophers on his sexist views, rather than a blunt acceptance that “it does not matter in the
scheme of philosophical thought”. Lange tells us that a conversation with Aristotle about women
would look like this:
Aristotle: “Every woman is (and ought to be) a non-citizen.”
Responder: “Why?”
A: “Because every woman is inferior to every male citizen.”
R: “Why?’
A: “Because every woman is devoid of the highest form of human reason.”
R: “Why?”
A: “Because every woman has inadequate vital heat for the exercise of the highest form of
human reason.”
R: “Why?”
A: End of discussion: “Because having less vital heat than a male is what a woman is.”
OR “That is how “woman” ought to be defined” (Lange 23).

Aristotle uses biological premises to decide his opinions on women, and it is not
considered by many to be necessary to understanding Aristotle, so his sexism often goes ignored
by scholars. His key terms and what most of his philosophy is hinged upon is “form” and
“matter”, “mover” and “moved”, “actuality” and “potentiality”. These are all so essential, and
somehow so many ignore the fact that they are gender coded. This is not just in the anatomical
sense of a male generates inside of another, while a female generates inside of themselves, but
this also applies to “ability” and “faculty”. Aristotle seems to think that while men can create
4

their own thoughts and have their own “faculties” within themselves that women still need an
external source. This is to say that a woman has less vital heat than a man or less of a life-giving
source that encompasses both intellect and procreation. Ultimately, the intelligence and worth of
women must rely on another. Importantly to Aristotle the biological function is also key; menses
are, to him, the same as semen, but they hold less value due to them being greater in quantity, but
less powerful the smaller and weaker nature of them, and that since it comes from a woman it
has less vital heat within it than a man3. The key distinction that is in many ways the most
offensive is that while women can participate in generating a child, only man has the vital heat
needed to give that child a soul. This is due to the fact that “women are just impotent males”4.
While this may be the introduction of rhetoric on women into philosophy, women in the
medieval period, which was strongly defined by its use of Aristotle, used these biases as gasoline
and started a fire.

Medieval
To talk about medieval philosophy means to speak about some women that generated
mass amounts of philosophy, this is to look at Hildegard of Bingen, Marguerite Porete, and
Christine de Pisan. These are women that fundamentally changed the way we do philosophy;
they spoke non-universally and impacted the way we can think about the world around us. I took
Medieval philosophy expecting to be disappointed, but I think I gained more insight into what it
meant to be a feminist from these women, than in any class before. This is what I learned.

3
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What we see uniquely in Marguerite Porete’s The Mirror of Simple Souls (1310), is this
contention between love and reason, as to which has more virtue and is better at attaining a life
with G-d. As I have offered earlier it is quite reasonable to believe that at this time (and still
now) that reason is considered to be more masculine or something done by men, while love is an
emotion and therefore more “feminine”. What Marguerite tells us is that love is the winner of
every battle, that if you truly live your life encompassing this magnificent love that G-d has then
you will be in perfect union and moral right with them. To live with all-encompassing love, that
would tell us to love everyone, would teach us to treat others in a morally correct way. To Porete
this looks like treating all equally and with the same love she feels from G-d. We would not treat
others as less than or as someone we love less due to this nature. This means treating all peoples
in a way that is kind and good. To be encompassed and to make choices by love would teach us
that we ought to live, and love, in a way that treats all peoples as important. This unrelentless
love can cause many morally right decisions. This love is not something we see often in
philosophy, and it is truly beautiful.
When talking about Marguerite it seems important to have one other kind of mysticism in
conversation with her, as the goal of all mysticism may be to become one with G-d, yet the
mystics would argue there are different ways to attain this. The other being Hildegard who
attempts to have a sort of mysticism that calls to be one with G-d completely via visions that tell
us how to live. Hildegard would say that following these visions can give us many moral truths.
Yet, we see she still uses “feminine” emotion, specifically fear, as a way to attain this union.
When looking at St. Hildegard specifically we need to contend with fear as the primary
emotion she can proffer us with in how we should have a relationship with G-d. This is a unique
concept as Hildegard tells us that fear of G-d is the best way to become one with G-d due to the
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rigid beliefs of the medieval times that in order to be able to properly be Christian there needed
to be fear of being punished. She gives us an argument that this allows women to overpower men
because of their incredible capacity to live in fear (Hildegard 12). While this is a sexist notion
that associates negative emotions with women, it is important to note that this fear is powerful in
our battle for morality. If we live in fear of what will happen if we commit a moral wrong,
logically it would follow that we are more likely to be committing morally neutral action or even
possibly a morally right action. Insofar that this fear is feminine (not truly but according to the
scholars of this period) having “feminine” emotions will actually teach us a lot about being in
union with G-d.
For me this learning point came when, in my Medieval Philosophy course, Dr. Knorr
from the English department at Regis University came to speak to us, this is when my feminist
world was truly flipped upside-down in how I thought about the medieval scholars. The most
important insight I gained from her presentation is mostly how many topics from this period are
still applicable to today. The content that these women are working on created the groundwork
for many different types of religious philosophy today such as the discussion of whether or not
our relationship to G-d should be one of fear or a positive omni-benevolent one. It is also
important that we note that utopias and the idea of a philosophical “perfect” society that can
solve for all ethical dilemmas and lead to an escape.
This looks like Christine de Pasain and her feminism still being fully applicable to
modern day society. This impacted me much more than some other issues as this was one, I
attempt to do with my philosophy daily. This is the kind of philosophy I strive to create, one that
talks about social issues, and impacts others. We all enjoy some kinds of philosophy more than
others and as someone who loves ethics and phenomenology this allowed me to see that these
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topics and ideologies that I love so much are also accessible in these older philosophies.
Christine’s City Of Ladies gave me access to first person narrative, teaching by example, and
being bold—all characteristics I had not seen from women in philosophy yet.

Modern- Descartes et al
What does it mean to be capable of freeing your mind from your body, and not having
your body impact how you may think or exist on an intellectual level? Descartes asks us to do
just that, to disconnect your mind from your body, and to not let any bodily implications affect
you. This is an approach that inherently removes some groups of people from society as they are
not capable of completing this separation successfully, as bodies impact daily lives and how one
interacts fully with society. For many women (for example) it is extremely hard to separate your
knowledge from the outside world from the bodily harm that is often imposed by being a part of
it. This is due to the fact that women are born into a structure imposed upon them by society, for
that shan’t be escaped due to society being so imbedded with these structures. How do you
interpret the world, when the world has never let you be free from your appearance and what it
wants of you? This causes for it to impossible for some people to participate in Descartes “I
think therefore I am”5, this logic is currently accepted as the norm, and the “correct” way to be
philosophical, obviously this excludes many people from being able to participate.
This has led to most of what we consider to be feminist theory within philosophy.
Analytic philosophy being so exclusionary caused the beginning of a movement, categorized at
its beginning with many papers all entitled “Feminist Critique of Descartes”6. When Descartes

5
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chose to be boldly against what we would typically call phenomenology and the concepts of
precarity and being one with our bodies. Phenomenology requires for us to understand our place
not just within our intellect, but also to be intentionally directed to the world. This intentionality
is placed in the fact that our consciousness always has a direction it is going via solicitation from
the world. This solicitation is what can give each individual meaning. This also is the key
concept that allows those who exist in precarious situations to persist and push forward with their
lives

Translations and Language
In light of the fact that philosophy has been done and written in many languages, it is
often difficult to evaluate an author’s attitude towards women because of unclear or mistaken
translations. At one point in my philosophical past, I pointed out sexism in a piece of text, the
response I got was that “oh you just got(?) a bad translation”. At that point I was quite upset,
how could this man (one of higher qualification) tell me that I, a woman, am wrong about
sexism. The more I thought about it the more it did make sense, how could I truly know what
Lucretius meant, since I do not know Latin? Translation could lead us to believe something that
was not the intent of the author, and this is particularly the case when our language does not have
enough or different words.
Our language is also so key to my discussion on the Socratic Method as adversarial. The
way we have gendered our language leads to some insights that are key not only to explaining
why this method is problematic, but also how we have gendered larguage to often be assumed to
describe one gender, which harms all. Semantics are key in the way we discuss and yet, they
seem to be taken for granted in the academic world. An example of this is if Socrates was to call
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himself a good man of virtue (Agathos) even if he does not participate in welfare or family
structure. This is a statement often accepted without further questioning. We as readers are
accepting an underlying current here according to Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka in their
book Can Language be Sexist; what they tell us is that we are under the assumption that since the
word “good” is next to the word “man” that he is being good in relation to other males, rather
than in relation to the interests of society as a whole. What we must ask now is “can a woman be
a good man?”, the answer is no. Insofar a woman is a good man she fails to do what society
would tell us is the duty of a woman; the concept of “goodness” here, but not in general, is
semantically sexist. We see that “goodness” here seems to be related to whether a person or thing
performs its function well, rather than an idea of something being “good” in any ethical way. It
seems that often semantically we use these terms to denote worth based upon function rather
than the true, moral, meaning behind it.
When looking deeper into language, we must also look into the gendered connotations of
certain words. We see this within the words “aggressive” or “emotional”. In our society these
words refer to polarized attitudes, emotions, and actions. that can only be represented by one
gender group. Men throughout history have been allowed to be aggressive while women are
shamed for it, and vice versa for emotionality. This has caused the way our society views these
words to be entrenched in gender, as they are acceptable under different circumstances. Women
that are aggressive are still condemned in our society. Just think to the most recent presidential
cycle, in which many women candidates were forced to discuss gender issues and families rather
than the policy they desired to, such as war and international relations. On the other hand, for
men, aggression is a positive emotion that is used to give them power and space within
disciplines and work. So, when I say within this thesis that women cannot participate in acts of
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aggression due to societal constraints, it is not that women do not want to be aggressive, it is that
they cannot be aggressive without losing so much due to how engendered the words have
become.
Ultimately, philosophy has a stark history of exclusion of people and shaming many that
may not traditionally participate within society. This history is compounded by the way we use
language and how this leads to a specific view of women.

The Alienation of Women
Alienation From Others
Alienation from others looks like insofar as we decide not to play the game, we then
become alienated from the discipline as a whole, we have less access to the discipline and those
inside as well as less access to publishing, school, mentorship, the keys to become successful.
My personal example of this is within a class once I gave what I thought to be a pretty strong
argument within a class, yet due to the fact that it involved first person narrative it was rejected
with the premise, well it can’t be backed up by any of the philosophers we are learning about
(men). Many can understand this as a feminist approach to Marx’s theory of alienation from
society. When we decide to not work within the current unnecessary constraints of philosophy,
including all of the unnecessary exclusion that happens, we are drowned by rejection and silence.
This unnecessary exclusion often looks like not valuing all voices within the classroom and
forcing al philosophical conversations to be a “debate”.

Alienation From Self
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The alienation from self is one where we cannot be one with our work as philosophers.
When we decide to engage in the “game” that philosophical thought is we must produce work
that may not be authentic to us. This means that we have no authority over what we create, we
must speak in a universal is often what this looks like, and not only that, but our work has a value
to it that is assigned to it from others. While this may not seem to be an inherent harm, as all
disciplines assign value such as this, it seems to be particularly harmful when the value is
unbalanced such as in philosophy with a skew towards analytics.
The other form of alienation we feel here is from the mode of how we produce our work.
My entire, quite short, career as a philosopher I have done my work for others, to please those
who want me to write in universals and do a specific type of philosophy. This causes alienation
from the self as this is not what I want to be doing. Writing first person philosophy laced with
mostly radical feminist theory makes me so happy.

Boundary Struggles
Nancy Fraser in her book “Capitalism and the Contradiction of Care” gives us an
insightful analysis to how women experience boundary struggles in disciplines that do not value
them equally. These boundary struggles are the failure of a society to let our reproductive work
and our “productive” (paid) work to intersect. This is quite common in any job for women, yet it
is even more prevalent in philosophy. An analytic profession will always force a bigger removal
of social reproduction from productive labor as the themes common to social reproduction are
removed from the discipline. In an analytic setting, as philosophy commonly is, we remove
ourselves from our work, we must only use our minds and not our bodies. Women’s bodies are
traditionally heavily tied to their reproductive work, due to the nature of childrearing and the way
housework is done.. It is impossible to remove yourself from your body, especially when it
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changes so much about you and how you exist within the world. Insofar as philosophy is asking
us to analyze and ask about the world, it would only be fair that we are allowed to have our body
involved, yet that is not trusted in traditional philosophy; deduction and reasoning “should”
always come before the bodily senses. This alienates women from one of their biggest identity
factors not only in the way others perceive them, but through how they perceive themselves
within social reproduction.

The Socratic Method as Adversarial
Hierarchical Dialogue
Hierarchical dialogue exists in all ways of life, but the way it exists within philosophy
causes a unique bias against one individual within philosophical conversations. In [insert text
name], Marilyn Friedman gives us a unique analysis of how the conversational part of
philosophy is done, and I will build upon this analysis to explain how hierarchical dialogue
explicitly causes the most harm.
What Friedman states is that philosophical conversation is in many ways a “contest of
wills, a verbal smackdown” rather than a respectful interchange7. This is how philosophy has
developed, it is a conversation between the “philosopher” and between the “novice” who the
philosopher is highly capable of outsmarting with superior logic. This seems to be a crucial
element to how philosophy is done; it has adapted this conversational method of attacking rather
than respect due to the precedent set forward by the “greats”.
The clearest example of this is Socrates in any of his dialogues written by Plato. We often
see him speaking to a “novice” who he is able to outsmart and will always be better than. These
7
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people, while they may be dedicated and well respected in their fields, are novices in philosophy,
and therefore are often unaware of some of the concepts philosophers find to be most basic, like
constructing a valid argument to convey reason properly. This sets up the idea for those within
philosophy that this trickery and way of discussing is the ultimate way to succeed. So, what
happens now when all the canon that is read commonly is of this structure and discourse? It
adapts to become the way that philosophy is done, philosophy becomes a game of winning and
losing. The prime example of this is in Plato’s Euthphyro where Socrates speaks to a priest. After
many attempts to explain what piety is from Euthphyro he becomes extremely embarrassed and
runs away rather than staying and being able to even learn from his errors due to the immense
shame he feels.8
But what does this have to do with women? There is a hierarchy that also exists in society
built upon a long history of inequity, one where women are less than men, and that’s the way
society continues to function. It has been talked about in previous sections just how hard it is to
see women within philosophy as a force with authority and how uncommon it is for that to ever
happen. This causes for women to have to be the “novice” or the lower-level thinker within
hierarchical dialogue since it seems to be accepted as their place within society and now within
the discipline. This leads to the bias that women within philosophy are incapable of attaining or
understanding “wisdom” or “reasoning”, which leads to a large amount of discrimination within
the discipline. Often it is just seen as a solution that can be solved via winning the argument, yet
women are in a particular double bind that if they do win, they are seen as being “bitchy” or
more assertive than structural norms want women to be. It is understandable that many find this
engagement positive, more education for that one person and, it seems that they become

8
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enlightened. Yet, often when students and others are told their ideas are wrong, they stop
contributing and fear that they will never be good enough for those that they are surrounded by
(even though they are).
The ancient Greek word for Socrates’ method of philosophy is elenchus. This is the
concept of turning someone’s soul through such shame that they are persuaded. The majority of
the dialogues do not end in an amicable manner rather with the opposition running away. To me
this concept is so astonishing, the concept of such shame and aggression that you can change the
entire way someone thinks. While I would contend you cannot shame someone into their soul
turning you can shame someone into not actually expressing their opinion in a conversation and
feeling shut down. I have experienced these many times in my classes. An example of this was
when I was asked to student teach about philosophy. I chose something I care about deeply. I
decided to talk about identity, a key part of phenomenology, and for minorities, one of the keys
to understanding our place in the world. We discussed Gloria Anzaldua’s Geography of Selves,
which discusses phenomenology and how we interact with the world. Our class discussed how
we face the world and how our identities cause us to interact differently in social structures. This
includes race, gender, sexuality, and anything else that can make us an “other”. We talked about
how we can be fragmented in our identities and pulled into two different directions at once. I
poured so much of my time and my mental energy into preparing this, and it went well, at first.
Students related and shared some of their experiences and how race, gender, sexuality, and
economic factors have impacted them in society. After the class was taught, with five minutes
remaining the two senior white male professors publicly, while me and my partner were standing
in front of the class, shamed us for our presentation. We were told that race should not be
important, and minimized the experiences of everyone in the class, telling us that by sharing our
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experiences we were the ones oppressing ourselves by choosing to label our identity. It was
shocking and hurtful, and I felt so alienated due to the massive power imbalance that exists
within the discipline. The professors had an open discussion with us, and many students tried to
explain how they felt and why their identities mattered, but due to the power dynamic it was
ultimately deemed that our group was being selfish and did not have authority over the subject.

Aggression in Dialogue
In The Myth of the Neutral “Man” Janice Moulten explains that aggression typically has
well deserved negative connotations, especially when it is physical. In historical contexts,
aggression is rage, anger, belligerence. Yet aggression has a unique positive connotation in
specific disciplines, like law, politics, philosophy. These are spheres where one does not have to
eat or attack their coworkers to be considered aggressive, yet they have these traits: ambition,
authority, power, competence, and effectiveness. The expression of the concepts is often, well,
aggressive.9
The Socratic method is aggressive due to the violent nature of being talked down to. The
Socratic Method always gives one party power over another. The rhetoric that Socrates uses
often tend to belittle the other, even if they are an expert, and remove their validity within their
sphere. This is always an aggressive fight-like dialogue where there is a winner and a loser. This
translates heavily to the classroom insofar that we chose to idolize this sort of trickery, which I
know most of us do. I have engaged in many conversations where I was attacked as Socrates
would attack someone and would become what I would call a “victim” of this conversation.
Women feel aggressive tendencies, yet it is not socially acceptable to express this aggression,

9
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and when it is, women are shamed and excluded due to not conforming to norms, something that
causes alienation. This causes women to never be the aggressor, if they were they would surely
be susceptible to some level of backlash that many more aggressive women, including myself,
have seen within the discipline. This backlash often looks like a lack of engagement with any
philosophical ideas proffered or a lack of true seriousness about the ideas brought forward. This
is exactly what happened to many women that have been the first in their fields, such as
Christine de Pisan or Susan Brison.
It is assumed that the best way to do philosophy is to create a point that has an adversary,
the best adversary being one that has the most extreme opposition. This should not be the way
we go about philosophy. To be the most aggressive against an opponent’s argument and the most
in distinct opposition just to have discussion is why philosophy is so slow to advance. Let us
think about ethics, specifically how we have yet to advance in a significant way for human
rights. This discourse is slowed due to this aggressive response and approach. For example,
consider the sheer amount of polarization in the debate about abortion. While this seems like a
truly complex issue there is a solid standstill in the debate, which comes from the fact that when
we discuss human rights, we cannot even come to a consensus on who we should consider to be
human. Insofar as we cannot even have this agreement, that progress cannot exist. It seems that
ethics would progress more if there was a basic level of agreement and a higher level of critique
on the mechanism or how rights are weighed, rather than the painful stark contrast of rights or no
rights. A more basic level of agreement would look such as philosophers agreeing that the
problem needs to be solved and that the mechanism for solving it is often one of broader social
change. Basic agreement can also simply look like allowing the statement that “humans should
have rights” flow with no opposition. While having the deeper debates about who we even can
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consider human is important it seems that often these extremely nuanced conversations hold up
the ability to further the broad social change.
Within all of these different facets of the Socratic Method, there have been many
problems caused for women and other minorities within the space of philosophy. These come out
within stereotype threat, implicit bias, and atypical groups. The harms that these three
specifically have on women explain a large amount of why women may feel more pressure.

Stereotype Threat, Implicit Bias, and Atypical Groups
The concepts of stereotype threat, implicit bias, and atypical groups are important to
understanding how women became the “other” within philosophy. They are, in many ways, the
three keys to understanding how women cannot succeed in philosophy in its current state. no
matter how publicly inclusive the discipline may claim to be. Exclusion is a causal factor to how
these relationships work, and let it be clear all different groups of people can experience these
detriments.
It is important to note that others within the community, those who are queer or not
white, are also impacted greatly within philosophy as they are a traditionally marginalized group.
Yet, I am choosing to write my thesis on something that I have experienced, being a woman.
This is not to say that these groups deserve less discussion, but it is my fundamental belief (as it
should be of all philosophers) that doing a deep dive about this issue does not take space away
from others. Both discussions can be had and both discussions should be had.

Stereotype Threat
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Stereotype threat is a different and quite new phenom. Within the philosophical sphere
large amounts of research on the matter has been done by Jennifer Saul. She explains that
“Rather than affecting the way that members of a stigmatized group are perceived, stereotype
threat affects the way a group actually performs”10. Saul cited studies that showed that when
women know that there will be any number of people around them, even one, that do not believe
they can do the task at hand, that they are more likely to fail. The study used tests with basic
disciplinary questions on it, when women were in a space alone or with others that did not hold
negative stereotypes outwardly against them, they performed significantly better, than when
there were those who were prejudiced around them. Those who fall victim often underperform as
they are subconsciously fearful of confirming the stereotypes that align with their identity. The
quantitative and empirical data on this will be discussed in detail within my data section in case
you have doubts.
When a situation holds a threat, the group that the threat comes from is constantly
underperforming; when a group is in a situation removed of threat, groups perform equally.
Stereotype threat has no empirical studies done within philosophy, yet it seems to be a fair
assumption to predicate that philosophy is seen as stereotypically male. I would justify this by
the fact that those who are not philosophers when asked to name philosophers will only give you
male names, as common philosophical knowledge has become plagued with Plato, Kant,
Descartes, and dry existentialists such as Camus11. It seems as though this may not be enough to
count philosophy as a specific discipline as stereotypically male, yet when we look at broader
society the association with reason and objectivity within thought has long been dominated by
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males, while women are left with emotion and subjectivity as their predominant stereotypes of
thought.
To solidify this argument Helen Beebee,a talented feminist theorist, will be consulted.
She writes about stereotype threat eloquently stating “Once we grant that combative and
aggressive behaviors are deemed to be culturally masculine behaviors, the alienating affects of
such behaviors can be seen as a trigger for stereotype threat”12. Beebee argues similarly to me in
many ways that if we can disengender philosophy and de-masculinize it that those who have a
feminine comportment will be able to participate in philosophy fully and without fear of others
prejudice. Those masculine traits she speaks of are the very ones that have defined the sphere of
philosophy in an academic sense for its entire existence. Philosophy is purposefully adversarial,
to create results, and often this is the exact opposite of how society encourages women to
interact. We often see the women who act adversarially become shamed. The key example is
how Susan Brison once creating a work of phenomenology relating to women’s experience was
excluded from many philosophy spaces after as she could not be taken as a “serious philosopher”
if she was to write upon these issues and “ignore analytics”.13
The research done on stereotype threat tells us that the minority group, in this paper,
women, shall underperform and conform to their stereotype when threatened, which happens
almost constantly within philosophy, Beebee would give an example of a seminar, where
philosophical papers are questioned and attacked routinely, with no exception. When in this
threatening situation women become “woefully ignorant” and “professionally incompetent”. This
tends to be due to the engendered norm that those of feminine comportment are more emotional
and less logical. As I have stated previously about our language, even if we believe that we are
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more engaged and understanding in how gender affects our biases in perceptions that this is not
true, so many of these stereotypes are so embedded into our society at so many levels that they
still exist even if we think they do not. A prime example is the rhetoric we get every single time
a woman attempts to gain power within the political system.14 Attempting to gain political power
is inherently adversarial, as candidates must run against one another in order to gain this power.
We still see that the rhetoric of women being incapable of even being rational is so pervasive and
used as a weapon.
Insofar as women are also so underrepresented in philosophy and it has become the new
normal for most men within philosophy to not even notice that women are not there. Women,
however, do notice, and this creates new pressures upon women in philosophical spaces. This is
the second way that stereotype threat finds itself pervasive in philosophy. This is why women
feel a threat to underperform, they can see that there are no women around them, that the ones
that are present are silenced, and that it is common to be dismissed. Gloria Anzaldua tells us
“Others fear the men for other similar reasons: being thought less of, ignored, disliked, displaced,
not allowed space… women are still the old standby for projections, still demonized”15. This can
incite a fear that I have felt often, when the normal is silence and there is no one to show you
how to be a loud and impactful woman, how do you do it? I have been subject to stereotype
threat time and time again. The times I have had any positions of power in class with male
teachers I have been shut down so hard. I remember once when I challenged a philosophy
professor he shut me down immediately, I was “wrong” and was not an authority, even though it
was a situation in which I was talking about women’s issues. When women speak out and chose
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to be courageous and share, they are breaking the stereotype of silence, and are shamed and
bullied into submission.

Implicit Bias
Implicit bias has been studied significantly by science in recent years and has ties to
everyone, even those who see themselves as the most egalitarian within social settings. As Saul
explains this bias is exceptionally pervasive as it encompasses even those who part of the said
group16. This is to say that not only men have implicit bias against women; both men and women
have implicit bias against women. This may seem far out of the philosophical realm as
philosophers do pride themselves on being egalitarian, yet we should look at anonymous review
done by A. Budden et al in 2008. What this review showed is that when the names upon
philosophy papers for publication were truly anonymous that the publication and selection of
women’s papers went up by 33%. The papers being of all the same quality show quite well that
the reason for this increase was the diminished capability to have an implicit bias17.
This should be enough data to allow for this argument to be made, yet if it is still doubted
whether implicit bias exists let us look at studies done by V. Valian and J. Madera et al, in
studies done by both groups the same results were yielded within the classroom. Men were more
likely to be called upon, the same paper had a higher grade when submitted under a male name,
graduate men are encouraged more often to get their work published, and men are more likely to
receive letters of recommendation than women. In this study although, it seemed that not only
men had a bias towards men, but women yielded the same results also having a bias towards
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men. This point is hard for me to make as most institutions in academia seem to have a gender
bias when it comes to publishing. Although, as someone who cares deeply about my discipline
and as someone who understands philosophy deeply, I would hope to be able to prove that this
discipline within itself should still do the work even if others are not.
Let it be clear the problem of implicit bias nor the aforementioned stereotype threat have
any solutions once women successfully become an employed philosopher. Louise Antony shared
how when she entered a classroom, she advised the previous and more senior professor on late
work, he shared that he did not allow and penalized late work, so Antony adopted the same
policy. What happened was she discovered she had over 40 missing and late papers and that
most of the students would fail due to the tardiness. She contacted the senior professor again, and
she asked what he had done in this situation. It had never happened when he was teaching the
class. Often it may seem as if women leave these double-bind situations once they are in a job,
ones that show that the authority of women is not respected to begin with. It turns out that when
she chose to hold firm on her policy and authority many students bullied her in teacher
evaluations and seemed to have never valued her authority to begin with.
So often in academia you must change to exist in the space with those with power. You
must confine yourself to tradition and the philosophy that is accepted by those with excessive
power, often classical analytic philosophy. Time and time again I have felt the need to change
my attitude and the way I act to conform to what is expected of me as a woman.

Atypical Groups
The concept of atypical groups whether we label it philosophical or sociological inspired
the majority of this paper. Atypical groups to me are the easiest way to explain the process of
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change and the blindness to inequity that is purported by so many in academia. Atypical groups
start with the typical in actuality and then understand what is not. The easiest way to understand
this concept is through a study done by Miller, Taylor, and Buck. Their study was not
specifically on philosophy yet was on US voters. In their studies they first asked participants to
identify a typical US voter, the majority (82%) answered male. This means that to many the
atypical voter is a woman, and when asked who the typical voter was not and 72% answered
women. When asked why women are less likely to vote they were told that perhaps the system
does not allow change for women. Then the most important question was asked: To allow for
women to vote should the system change to have men vote more like women or should women
become more like males. The answer was 85% the latter, that women are the ones who need to
make the effort to change. This means that the burden to not be the atypical group and to gain
equity is put only on the group that is atypical in the first place18.
This may seem uninfluential within philosophy, yet we must look at the way that
philosophy is done. Beebee so eloquently states that philosophy is “combative” and
“aggressive”19. This combativeness and aggressiveness are predominately a male characteristic
as explained in the stereotype threat section previously. Yet, this can be extremely alienating to
many women. Women are the atypical within philosophy, this has already been determined by
the strong lack of the public knowing much about women identifying philosophers, and the fact
that within the field they are so underrepresented. This means that women within the field are
expected to now become aggressive or combative and the problem now erupts twofold. The first
option is plainer in the sense that women will be thrown into these aggressive situations that are
often philosophical discussions and leave. After all, we know that the reason so many women
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leave philosophy is that the academia feels as if it is an attack on their existence and worth20. The
second path that emerges is that a woman stays and then becomes these traits that are so
masculine, the effects of this are often implicit bias and stereotype threat, yet we also see women
losing who they are as individual philosophers to take on these more “masculine attributes”. Not
only is this a detriment to what could be an addition to ways of thought, but often when women
display these traits they are seen as manipulative and some other not kind words as even though
they present the male characteristics of philosophy, they are still women. It seems that women
can never win.
There are, however, many women that can be considered outliers to this dilemma, ones
whose paths did not fit on either of these. I contend that this is quite amazing to have happened,
but I also wonder how much resistance were on these paths. It seems that to not take either of
these is to push against all that is accepted and to become on the “outside”. This outside exists
for me as a push back on the system and writing about a paper on the system while allowing
myself to be mentally outside of the system. While this may be the path to success for some, we
should not accept that it needs to be hard or alienating for women to succeed.

Why Care?
That is the age-old question of truly any paper, why should anyone else care about this?
Peter Godfrey-Smith a well-known philosopher of science, explains the purpose of philosophy
the best to me “Doing philosophy is a matter of trying to put things together, trying to get the
pieces of very large puzzles to make some sense”21. It may seem to have no relevance to this
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thesis, yet it explains in a broad way why philosophy should care about a problem it has never
cared about before. The most basic reason I can give for anyone to care, especially those within
the philosophical community, is that the whole purpose of philosophy is to ask broad questions
about society and all of its facets. In order to do so, philosophy must be inclusive to a variety of
perspectives and methods.
Philosophy deserves to have all experiences and opinions known, otherwise the discipline
is of less value than it could potentially hold. If philosophers cannot hold themselves to searching
for questions that encompass the whole public, then they are not good philosophers, and if they
are so biased that they cannot ask questions that encompass all groups of people and an
understanding of all groups of people then they are also bad philosophers. Philosophy has no
purpose if it cannot be inclusive to all who exist.
Even further we must analyze how philosophy is done in the sense of argumentation. It is
often a battle between opinions and a game of defending opinions. While the true purpose of
philosophy is to ground our opinions in reasoning, this thought process of “battling” is so
pervasive that this true purpose is often forgotten or ignored. Often those who are minorities in
philosophy attempt to create philosophies and ideologies that support all marginalized peoples
and allow for all to be included, yet there will always be naysayers and those against these ideas.
It gets tiring having to defend your existence daily. It seems unfair to have to continuously
defend your rights as a human, and this can often get extremely exhausting, causing women to
leave the field.

Data
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If you do not buy any of these arguments pragmatically there are large amounts of data to
back up my statements. Qualitative data has told us that women feel repressed and
underrepresented but let us also look at the quantitative aspects. They show us the broader
picture of how few women numerically exist within philosophy as a whole, and also different
types of philosophical publications. There are many analyses to how this data can teach us to be
better.
The article Why Do Women Leave Philosophy by Thompson, Adleberg, Sims, and
Nahmias gives very interesting numerical statistics on why women are underrepresented. The
most important statistic that I will be using from this piece as a quantitative set of data. They
looked at many syllabi across the country and discovered the range of female philosophers read
within each class is between 5%-20%. What is most important is that no matter the percentage
men often would poll that they felt women were represented fairly and all other minority groups
would argue they were so underrepresented that they did not feel validated within the
classroom22. 5-20% should not be an acceptable amount of diversity, but it is interesting to
consider why men thought this was fair. The answer I believe to be true is that is the way the
think the discipline is. Insofar as women only make up a small percentage of the content read it
makes sense to males that are in the discipline that women actually are not a large part of
philosophy, as this is what is being taught to them. Not only does this teach men that a lack of
women is ok in the discipline, but it also teaches women that they do not belong. In a study, Erin
York Cornwell and Valerie Hans of Cornell University found that when making decisions about
how to participate in society, those who are minorities are more likely to have an increased
participation when an increase in representation exists. Therefore, a decrease in representation
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often leads to a decrease in a desire to participate, especially when those people are now
alienated due to the lack of representation. This entrenches a lack of women and leaves no space
for solvency.
My next data article: New Data on the Representation of Women in Philosophy Journals
written by Wilhelm, Conklin, and Hassoun builds on many of the aforementioned statistics by
providing a strong analysis of these statistics and what they mean. This article explains in a lot of
ways how this data is harmful and how the numbers must be taken for what they actually are and
not misconstrued as many of my naysayers do. It is key to note that while yes, the overall
representation of women in philosophy has increased, this increase is concentrated in certain
areas of the discipline. Overall, as of 2022,33% of philosophers are women, a massive jump
from the 16% in 2016. In the table (see pg. 40) you can see that the number of women has
increased to 24% in journals that are related to the mind and language, yet women in other
philosophical journals are still at a measly 12.4%.23 This is due to the fact that women are pushed
into certain streams of thought within philosophy, even within the publication process. As a
woman it is much easier to feel wanted and to actually be wanted within a journal on feminist
theory rather than an analytical philosophy journal. This is due to the fact that women’s
contributions are often only valued either by other women, or in fields that men dare not touch,
hence feminist theory.
The first analysis is that women’s contributions are often read more often by women due
to the relationship we feel towards those who are similar to us. Feminist theory as a whole is
definitely more popular among women and when looking at classes that are comprised of mostly
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women authors, the class is on average 95% women24. The other analysis comes from the fact
that men tend to shun types of philosophy that are done by women, yet at the same time
pigeonhole women into a few strands of philosophical thought. If a woman ever dares to touch
topics that pertain to mostly women, such as Susan Brison did in Aftermath, they could have an
experience similar to her. She was told she would never be valued for any of her work that was
not on women, she was from then on always defined as just a feminist theorizer, not inherently a
problem, but not what she wanted. She also found that she was rejected by many philosophical
conferences, because the men there did not believe that she could ever be an authority on “real”
philosophy post her writing her book on sexual assault. This rhetoric on who can do what in
philosophy is extremely toxic and contributes to the alienation of not only women, but anyone
who strays from what is considered to be “normal”.
The article Fair Numbers gives us two important graphs that explains truly how few
women there are in the realm of philosophy, when the paper was written two years ago the
percentage was 16%. The overall average percent of women in the discipline is still at a meager
33% as of 202125, this is not enough. Even in the sciences, which are the discipline that
traditionally is known for the most gender discrimination there is more gender diversity. The first
graph looks at overall representation of women in tenure-track positions at highly ranked
philosophy departments in US universities, and the second looks specifically at the articles
written by women. Overall representation at every level is bad, there is no other way to put it. It
has been 50 years and still the percentage of women studying philosophy is the same, the lack of
progress is explained through everything in this paper, yet this statistic is so shocking and has
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caused many to actually rethink their contributions to gender inequity within the discipline. It is a
harsh realization, yet it is necessary to get those who are within the discipline to wake up and see
what is truly happening around them.

(First Person) Narrative
First person narrative is a way to do philosophy that goes outside of what we are told to
do, speak in a universal voice. This is because talking about ourselves is seen as not being
definitive proof of a truth claim. How can we take our personal experiences as truths when often
logic can get us to an answer that seems to be more safe? Being able to speak in first person
allows a unique experience for others, to be able to exist in an imaginative body and do
imaginative politics. This looks like being able to exist within an experience of a marginalized
group and see what the impact of racism, sexism, etc. has on that person. This is how women
have done philosophy for ages, think Christine De Pasain and her City of Ladies. This is an
example of “over-proofing” where the story is done through many individualized and unique
first-person examples. Over proofing is highly effective for women within philosophy, hence the
rise of women engaging in first person narrative. If you can give enough real-world examples for
one argument, at some point it must be true. This allows for those who engage in this form of
narrative (currently marginalized philosophers) to be real and seen. First person is important, as
much as traditional philosophy wants to diminish it or ignore it within the publishing sphere.
This may be due to philosophy not liking this narrative, or it can be that it is a tool typically done
by minorities and these groups are underrepresented anyways. It is the reason I am able to tell
my story in this discipline.
My journey to asking this question is one that I have spent hours tormenting myself with
the correct way to share. I started doing philosophical thought in high school, I was a senior and
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pushed hard for a philosophy class to be offered. The course in itself was underqualified, the
teacher was a physics teacher who had taken one philosophy class in college. We spent the entire
semester discussing the concept of determinism and Pascal’s Wager—that was it. I have no hard
feelings against this teacher seeing as I pushed so hard for this class, but it is understandable how
I entered college not wanting to participate in philosophical discourse.
I was enrolled at random my first semester at Regis in the honors philosophy seminar. I
discovered philosophical discourse in a new way, one where my opinions mattered, and
questions and topics were infinite. I always say the best philosophers I have ever met are
overthinkers, and this class allowed me to expand my mind and overthink constantly—in a
productive capacity. I honestly fell in love, in a way I have never fell in love with any other
subject. It took me a while to leave my prior major (Early Childhood Education) because most
parents aren’t supportive of their children majoring in philosophy and alas, I had already
discovered how much of canon in philosophy disparages women. Luckily when I made the
switch my parents were beyond supportive, and I had built a network of amazing professors who
would always support my success and nothing less.
Coming from a philosophy major to this specific question was a journey within itself. I
had never planned on ethics or feminist theory being my topic. Junior year was hard, and with a
whirlwind of political and personal events I came to my topic. I was taking many philosophy
classes and was in a couple where I was the only woman, it may seem like not a large deal, but it
pulled me into the behaviors I normally saw me being ignored, talked over, and disregarded, in a
greater capacity than usual. That became muddled with the presidential election, which allowed
me on a large stage to see the same things that happened to me happen to a much more powerful
woman, Kamala Harris. These were months spent feeling so defeated, here at Regis and in the
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eyes of politicians. I was at the point of giving up on my two favorite things: my major,
philosophy, and my minor, politics.
I spent many late nights talking to my cohort and concluded I had to do something to ease
what I was feeling, and I wanted it to be something people actually cared about, hence the
perfect topic for an honors thesis. I knew I wanted to share a piece of me that I had fought so
hard to be successful in and this was the right way. had to use my voice for something, even if it
only impacted my space here at Regis. Writing about my experiences and being able to
hypothesize why they happened and how they can be solved was a form of therapy for me and
confirmed my passions. To be able to recommend women to be in conversation with the typical
canonical men, or to explain how to make discussion more inclusive gave me significant hope
for the discipline I loved so much. It made me proud to call myself a philosopher again.
In more recent times, I have felt radical. Everything has seemed to come back to being
alienated from myself and from my discipline. This seems to be an alienation that I only started
to realize that deep depths of while writing this thesis. I have known many philosophy majors in
my time at Regis that have picked their classes in an extremely particular way. They picked
classes that they knew the professors and students well in, and they picked these classes for the
knowledge of support, that their teachers and peers would offer support of their beliefs rather
than support their marginalization within philosophy. Those teachers understood that while the
canon is important, yet it also is something that can be contested by marginalized philosophers
and have a true discussion about the canon that is challenging. I would have told you I never did
this; in truth this is a lie. I didn’t realize that I was actually doing this myself, I was allowing
myself to be alienated from the topics I was interested in, due to the preservation of myself and
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mostly my mental health. I realized I was alienating myself from the discipline and wanted a
change, I became bold and branched out, only to experience even more alienation.
This new me was one that took classes I wanted to even if I knew the content was going
to be sexist inherently due to the authors or that my peers would challenge me. I was not ready
for the new kind of alienation I experienced. I now was in a dichotomy. This was one where I
was no longer alienated from the discipline as a whole, but I was alienated from myself. I was
often taken not seriously and shunned for having opinions. Not only was I alienated from the
classroom, as these classes were often filled with men that had a strong disdain for my
personality and boldness, yet I also felt alienated from the topics. Thomas Moore’s Utopia which
tells us that women are not actual people is alienating (whether it is satire or not), Aristotle’s
opinion that women are just impotent men is alienating, Descartes disdain for the body as a tool
is alienating. I felt as if everything I read did not value me and that was painful and made me
even more driven towards change.
The good that came from these trials came from a Greek concept, that of Parrhesia, or to
speak fearlessly. I at some level discovered how to do this within my discipline and how to speak
for myself and for others. I think if I had not discovered this concept and had been able to utilize
it to make myself more accepted and heard that I would not have been able to write this thesis or
be able to advocate for other women within the field.

Naysayers
Many believe that women actually are compensated for too much in philosophy and that
they are the majority within philosophical representation. Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich
both propogate this idea in their controversial article “Gender and Philosophical Intuition”.
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These authors believe that even if women within philsophy are underepressented numerically
this has no result on their substantive representation in academia. What I offer here will be two
lines of response, the first being that just because the number of women have increased cannot
directly correlate to the quality of their experince increasing, and secondly that women still face
(typically) womanly issues such as an emphasis on appearance.
I find this argument in many ways to use strawman logic, that is to distract from the real
problem at hand by saying another problem has been solved. Yes I will accept that the number of
women in philosophy overall has increased, yet this does not mean they have access to all
disciplines or that the quality of their experience has increased in a valuable way. When looking
at figure 1, as well as into the work of Benetreau-Dupin and Guillaume, we see that while the
number of women in the profession is increasing in quantity, they still only have access to
particular fields of philsophical thought, and even when they try to break free they are
pigeonholed. The book Aftermath, written by Susan Brison is a perfect example of this
conundrum. She broke into the world of philosophical publication having written an extremely
powerful book, particularly about gender related issues. From that point on she was often told
she would be stuck in that genre forever as a women who decided to write about feminist theory.
She became known for her unique style of philosophy and gender theory, yet not always in a
positive way. Brison dealt with many vieiwng her as a philosopher that could only do feminist
theory and not by the broad theorist she truly was, she was rejected from many circles.
The second piece to this argument is the factor of appearance. Women specifically must
conform to a specific appearance to be viewed as valid. Women are taken significantly more
seriously depending on their dress. We see that women who dress nicer and look more appealing
to men often have better chances of advancement within philosophy. This seems like an archaic
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notion, yet it still is true. Women who are more physically appealing to men tend to do better
within the discipline as they are given more opportunities at conferences, graduate school, and in
the faculty dynamic. It is extremely regretable for a discipline that prides itself on being derived
from thought, not just what a body is capable of. Kristin Dellinger did a study on workplace
environments and how dress affected how men and women were percieved. Dellinger found that
within workplaces that had mainly men that the women in that sphere were expected to dress
signifigantly closer to their gender norms to be seen as acceptable and professional. Yet when
looking at workplaces with mostly women, these norms were diminished. In academia as a
whole where there has always been more men than women, these pressures are often faced to
dress feminine and “nicely” as it has been deemed unprofessional to not be corralative to
engendered binary norms.
Many naysayers throughout the discipline as a whole suggest that the gender disparity in
philosophy has been solved for, as that was then and this is now, I have heard this many more
times than I should have. What I offer is that in actuallity while it may seem comforting to place
sexism within history books as an issue of the past, we see it thriving within modernity. One of
the recent extremely publicized cases was within the CU Boulder philosophy department. In
2014 a report released by the American Philosophy Association stated that CU Boulder
“maintains an environment with unacceptable sexual harassment, inappropriate sexualized
unprofessional behavior, and divisive uncivil behavior.”, this report was only created after more
than fifteen women came forward to share stories of sexual harassment by the male professors.

Solutions
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It seems that philosophy is something that can be done by all, yet it is not. There are three
clear solutions that I propose to allow for philosophy to become a more inclusive discipline. I
would offer you the definition of philosophy has to change from “just thinking” to asking
questions about the world around us. While on face value these may seem to be the same, when
discussing with people outside the major they often believe that philosophers truly do nothing
besides think about problems. Yet, when we can frame it as asking questions about the world,
this often turns the idea of what is happening as it allows for people to be pointed in a direction
that actually makes change. I think that most philosophers would agree with this definition as we
can only think about what we know, a key to why we need more diversity. As I explained earlier
not only does more diversity lead to better questions, but also to the ability to do philosophy in
an imaginative body, to be able to understand at some level what is experienced by those who we
inherently cannot access naturally, and to use this access to better the discipline.

The Canon
It seems to be forgotten by men, or possibly purposefully ignored that the canon comes
out of a place of total white male domination. The first major change that must happen to see a
higher level of inclusivity into the discipline is for the canon to be changed. When in an
introductory level philosophy class, it is often quite rare to ever read anyone but the “greats”.
The “greats” within philosophy are usually Kant, Sartre, Descartes, and a whole cast of other
white men. When the largest complaint by women is that they feel underrepresented it seems as
if the most obvious first step in the process to inclusion is to add other voices, particularly those
of women. While this may seem to be enough to allow for women to feel included, it is
important to spend time when reading the canon to note that not all opinions of a philosopher
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need to be taken into account with considered valuable or correct. For example, we can teach
Thomas More’s Utopia and allow for there to be room for discussion on how, while it is the most
read justice utopia in the canon, that it is not necessarily equitable in its treatment of all groups—
particularly women. Allowing for this discussion and understanding that philosophy is not an all
or nothing discipline allows for the minorities to feel more included.

What Are Ideas?
The second facet to being able to adequately include more individuals into
philosophy is to change the commonly accepted notion that there is only one way to properly
think about philosophy. Often, pupils are punished for not having the correct chain of thoughts,
even if the answer is still a valuable one. This causes for those who think differently to be
outcast, and for their process of doing philosophy to be humiliated. It is true that there are
valuable and non-valuable opinions within the philosophical sphere and that argumentation, and
a strong backing is necessary, but to judge the way one concludes simply because it is not the
most accepted way causes many impactful thinkers to be lost. Those who exist within a female
comportment inherently experience the world in a different way than those who do not exist
within that comportment. The body can cause many experiences that others cannot experience.
Experiences such as: higher rates of abuse, femicide, racism, and even those who experience
childbirth will have a new bodily experience that cannot be separated into just “reason”. Our
bodies interact with the forces that drive against us in the world daily, those experiences we
garner from the world can allow us to make different, if not even better, ethical choices. While it
may seem easy to square away this critique as only a critique on rationalists it is important to
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note that the majority of canon philosophers are rationalists and this permeates into teaching and
ideologies.26
When individuals who have had to take their bodily existence into account so often when
making choices for themselves, those who were brought into this life with pre-existing structures
dictating how they ought to live before they even could begin to rationalize, we are immediately
excluding those groups. These groups are anyone that happens to live in precarity, in situations
where they do not fit into the “inside” or the normative, and existence is on the “outside”. Bodies
exist within structures that have forces opposing against them, it is often how we make choices
about how we exist in the world, through the phenomenological idea that we exist within the
world. We react to what the world gives us, especially when our bodies are policed and forced to
look a certain way to belong. To think that it is flawed within our human nature to consider this
policing and how it has interfered within our lives is problematic at the base level and even
further is exclusionary of almost all of the voices that should matter the most when discussion
social justice and ethics.
Under this mode of thinking, one that prioritizes the ability to apply a universal maxim to
any ethical situation, there can be user error. The error of allowing our emotions, prior
experiences, and knowledge of our own bodily existence to get into the way. Under this system
user error seems to flourish and be seen as a problem. Often when our bodies are policed so
heavily, as every minority experiences, making decisions have many more levels than just a
“right or wrong”. Existing within a structure that imposes norms onto us causes for ethical
decisions to involve more thought, white cisgender men often do not have to think about how the
decisions they make could affect their right to exist or their right to be “correct”. Yet, it seems
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that in most moral judgment situations those who are situated in precarity must take these factors
of constant violence against their existence and knowledge into account. This forces anyone that
exists outside of the “normative” within society to be punished for ethical decisions that, often,
cannot have a correct answer that is deducted through pure reason. An example of a thought
experiment that requires this is given to us by Cohen when she explains that often it is harder for
minorities to feel comfortable answering the thought experiments and it takes them longer as
often there is a greater expectation to uphold a nonthreatening and “perfect” reputation. It is key
to guide students along their paths and to not place philosophy into a “one size fits all box” to
allow for a better diversity.

Success
We see that often within academic philosophy, success is considered to be a one path
journey. It is to attend a prestigious grad school and further the education of philosophy within
the individual, yet it is quite clear that this path is only for a select few. When diving deeper and
interrogating the lives of post-undergraduate philosophers there is a clear distinction found27.
This distinction separates white men from minorities. This is that often-white men are capable of
taking this path that is so accepted while minorities do something else, like community work.
(Beebee 28). In today’s society the majority of impactful community work, such as running nonprofits or charitable organizations is spear headed by philosophy majors, those who have the
critical question-asking skills to truly understand the core of change. This work is highly
undervalued and is often not seen as successful within the academic community.
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As aforementioned, success is a key reason why many would not identify with
philosophy or feel as if they belong within the community. Redefining what success is and
teaching that early allows for many to feel as if they are included within the discipline. This
allows for a safe space for philosophers to be more than just a philosopher, and to have a further
identity that often allows for more people to be reached by the impact the discipline may have. It
is quite easy to say that we underestimate the number of minorities in philosophy due to the fact
that they are often excluded from the discipline through deciding to leave due to systemic issues,
and that, actually, there may be a larger number, but it seems that even if these people exist, the
fact their existence is never considered still points to a greater structural problem.

Summation
The only way for philosophy to solve its diversity problem is to change and evolve, a
process that philosophy seems to pride itself so loudly upon doing every day. There is no easy fix
to the problems that I have detailed and even the solutions that I give can only do so much. I
write with hope that if these changes can be implemented and understood that a cycle will begin.
One where more women feel valued in these spaces and thrive more, and that once other women
can see others thrive that it builds confidence and courage—something men have held within the
discipline for years. The path to diversity in philosophy is not an easy one, but it can be done
with the help of a few deviant women.
This problem is presented to us through our use of the Socratic Method, one that is
extremely adversarial as it is hierarchical and aggressive. This is a method that has been used in
philosophy for longer than necessary, as the times have changed so has who participates in
philosophy, the Socratic Method is alienating to women and other minorities and causes large
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stigma and exclusion within access to the discipline. Alienation from something one loves should
never happen and even if you do not buy this, it is key to have a diversity of opinion in
philosophy, for any of our questions to be truly encompassing of all who exist in our society.
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APPENDIX

Figure 1

Figure 2
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